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Infrastructure protection on cisco ios software based platforms

infrastructure protection on cisco ios software based platforms

Security platform software Platforms based on SIEM (security information and event management) technology offer visibility and meaningful insights by. This built-in security provides platform integrity, facilitates secure Cisco IOS XE, combined with Cisco DNA ™ Center and Software-Defined Access. For example, validation of a digital signature on the Cisco IOS Software installed on a platform is evidence that an auditor can use to state that the. HOW TO ALLOW FILEZILLA TO TRANSFER MORE THAN 2 FILES AT A TIME Infrastructure protection on cisco ios software based platforms anydesk app download for pc windows 10

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To disable CDP globally use the no cdp run command from global configuration mode, as in the following example:. To disable CDP on one or more interfaces, use the no cdp enable command from interface configuration mode, as in the following example:. An IP directed broadcast packet is an IP packet whose destination address is a valid broadcast address for an IP subnet. When a directed broadcast packet reaches a router that is directly connected to its destination subnet, and if the router is configured to do so, that packet is "exploded" as a broadcast on the destination subnet.

By default, earlier releases of Cisco IOS software handle directed broadcasts this way. However, because directed broadcasts have been used for attacks, such as the SMURF attack, the default behavior has been changed to drop directed broadcasts since Cisco IOS software Release For more information about the ip directed-broadcast command, refer to the following URL:.

Finger, as defined in RFC , is a protocol that can be used to obtain information about users logged into a remote host or network device. Although the finger service does not reveal any extremely sensitive information, it can be used by a potential attacker to gather information.

Therefore it is recommended that you disable this service. In older releases of Cisco IOS software where the finger service was enabled by default, it can be disabled with the no service finger global configuration command, as in the following example:. Starting in Cisco IOS software If finger has been turned on and the service is not needed, it can be disabled with the no ip finger global configuration command, as in the following example:.

By default, MOP is enabled on all Ethernet interfaces, and disabled on all other type of interfaces. The MOP service can be disabled per interface by using the no mop enabled interface configuration command, as in the following example:. MOP has been proven vulnerable to various attacks; therefore it should be disabled on all access and externally facing interfaces unless they provide connectivity to DECNet networks.

For more information about the mop enabled command, refer to the following URL:. This service is turned on by default and it is used by features like AutoInstall, which simplifies or automates the configuration of Cisco devices. If not needed, this service should be disabled with the no ip bootp server global configuration command, as in the following example:.

By sending these redirect messages the router instructs the host the specific router to use to reach a particular destination. The ICMP redirect messages can also reveal information that can potentially be used by an attacker for discovering the network topology.

Therefore, it is highly recommend that you disable this service on all access and externally facing interfaces. IP redirects can be disabled on each interface using the no ip redirects interface configuration command, as in the following example:. For more information about the ip redirect command, see the following website:. The IP protocol supports source routing options that allow the sender of an IP packet to control the route that the datagram will take toward its ultimate destination, and generally the route that any reply will take.

These options are rarely used for legitimate purposes in real networks. Some older IP implementations do not process source-routed packets properly, and it may be possible to crash machines running these implementations by sending them datagrams with source routing options. As a general best practice, IP source routing should be disabled unless strictly necessary.

To have the software discard any IP packet containing a source-route option, use the no ip source-route global configuration command as in the following example:. For more information about the ip source-route command, refer to the following URL:. Therefore, unless needed, this service should be disabled with the no service pad global configuration command, as in the following example:.

Proxy Address Resolution Protocol ARP , as defined in RFC , is a technique that helps machines on a subnet reach remote subnets without configuring routing or a default gateway. Proxy ARP is typically implemented on routers, and when configured, the router answers all ARP requests on the local subnet on behalf of systems some hops away.

In this model, local hosts send ARP requests for each destination for which they do not have any routing information, and the router replies with its own MAC address as the next hop. However, unless strictly needed it should be disabled with the no ip proxy-arp interface configuration command, as in the following example:.

For more information about the ip proxy-arp command, refer to the following URL:. When implemented, the Ident service allows a user to obtain identity information by simple connecting to a TCP port on a system, and issuing a simple text string requesting information. This clearly can yield information that could be used to attack the system.

Cisco IOS software routers implement an Ident service, which is disabled by default. It is highly recommended that you do not enable this service. If the Ident service has been enabled, it can be disabled by using the no ip identd global configuration command, as in the following example:. For more information about the ip identd command, refer to the following URL:. TCP and UDP small servers are daemons that typically run on Unix systems and that were designed for diagnostic purposes.

Unless strictly necessary, these services should be disabled because they can be used by a potential attacker to gather information, or to directly attack the Cisco IOS software device. These commands may be disabled using the no service tcp-small-servers and no service udp-small-servers global configuration commands, as shown in the following example:.

Infrastructure protection access control lists iACLs is an access control technique that shields the network infrastructure from internal and external attacks. In a nutshell, iACLs are extended ACLs designed to explicitly permit authorized control and management traffic bound to the infrastructure equipment such as routers and switches, while denying any other traffic directed to the infrastructure address space.

For example, an iACL deployed at an ISP peering edge is configured to explicitly permit BGP sessions from known peers, while denying any other traffic destined to the ISP's peering router as well as to the rest of the infrastructure address space. By only allowing authorized control and management traffic, iACLs help protect routers from unauthorized access and DoS attacks based on unauthorized protocols and sources.

In addition, iACLs protect routing sessions by preventing the establishment of unauthorized sessions, and by reducing the chances for session reset attacks. It should be noted however, that iACLs are not effective mitigating attacks originated from trusted sources and based on trusted protocols. In an enterprise, iACLs may be deployed at the many network edges. Similarly, the filters deployed at the enterprise Internet edge may be designed to function as an iACL to shield the infrastructure from external threats.

For example, an enterprise Security Operations Center SOC team may decide to implement an iACL to protect its equipment from threats originated somewhere else in the enterprise, and despite the fact that iACLs may be already deployed at the WAN edge, Internet edge, campus or somewhere else. The SOC team may decide to do so simply to maintain control of the protection of its own infrastructure, rather than relying on security elements administered by other administrative teams.

As discussed at the beginning of this document, having an adequate design of the address space facilitates deployment of security measures. This statement cannot be truer than with iACLs. As we will see in this section, the degree of summarization, the level of segmentation between the infrastructure equipment and endpoints, have a direct impact on the number of lines and complexity of the iACL.

The more erratic the address space is the more complex the iACL will be and the more lines it will have. An iACL needs to be built in a structured manner recognizing the fact entries are processed sequentially like other ACLs. Though the specifics on how an iACL should be constructed depend on the particular deployment scenario, an iACL generally consists of four distinct modules, which are described next:. This includes control management traffic like routing protocols, remote access protocols i.

The first module is designed to block any obvious illegitimate traffic, such as packets arriving with a source IP address belonging to the internal infrastructure address space, as it is an indication of spoofing. Note RFC defines special use addresses that might require filtering. RFC defines reserved address space that cannot be used for valid source addresses on the Internet. RFC provides ingress filtering guidelines. The following is an example of useful entries for the first module of an iACL constructed for an ISP peering point or an enterprise Internet edge:.

This requires a clear understanding of the legitimate traffic bound to the infrastructure. An iACL built without the proper understanding of the protocols and the devices involved may end up blocking critical traffic. The third module of the iACL should deny any other traffic destined to the infrastructure address space, as shown in the following example:.

The fourth and final module of the iACL may be configured to either allow or deny all traffic, depending on the scenario. In ISP networks, which are transit networks in nature, this module should be configured to permit any other IP traffic. Likewise, in an enterprise inner iACL this module should also be configured to allow any other traffic.

Enterprise public networks are typically the destination for traffic not transit , and therefore the fourth module of an iACL deployed at an internet edge requires some special consideration. Depending on the existence of a firewall and the security policies in place this module may be configured to either allow or deny all other traffic. If the internet edge incorporates a firewall controlling access to the public enterprise network, then the last module of an iACL at the internet edge router may be configured to allow any other traffic as in the example above.

Per contrary, in networks where there are no firewalls or where the Internet edge router acts as a firewall, this module may be configured to specifically permit the protocols and the IP addresses for the public services, with an implicit "deny any" denying the rest of traffic. For example:. As previously mentioned, an iACL built without the proper understanding of the protocols and the devices involved may end up being ineffective and may even result in a DoS condition.

For this reason, it is vital to gain an adequate level of understanding about the legitimate traffic destined to the infrastructure before deploying an iACL. In some networks, determining the exact traffic profile needed to build the filters required might be difficult. For this reason, this document recommends a conservative methodology for deploying iACLs. To deploy iACLs using this conservative methodology, complete the following steps:.

Step 1 Identify protocols used in the network using a discovery ACL. Start by deploying a discovery or classification ACL, which permits all the commonly used protocols that access infrastructure devices. The discovery ACL should have a source address of any and a destination address that encompasses the entire infrastructure IP address space.

Logging can be used to develop a list of source addresses that match the protocol permit statements. A last line including permitting ip any any is required to enable traffic flow. The objective of configuring the discovery ACL is to determine the protocols that the specific network uses. Use the log keyword for analysis to determine what else might be communicating with the router.

Note Although the log keyword provides valuable insight into the details of ACL hits, excessive hits to an ACL entry including this keyword might result in an overwhelming number of log entries and possibly high router CPU usage. Only use the log keyword for short periods of time as needed to help classify traffic. Step 2 Review identified packets and begin filtering access to the infrastructure. Once the packets filtered by the discovery ACL have been identified and reviewed, deploy an ACL with a permit any source to infrastructure addresses for the expected protocols.

As in Step 1, the log keyword can provide more information about the packets that match the permit entries. In case the ACL is deployed in transit networks, the last entry should be a permit ip any any statement to permit the flow of transit traffic. This ACL will provide basic protection and will allow network engineers to ensure that all required traffic is permitted.

Step 3 Restrict the range of source addresses. Once you have a clear understanding of the protocols that must be permitted, further filtering can be performed to restrict the protocols to known or authorized source addresses. This step narrows the risk of attack without breaking any services and allows you to apply granular control to sources that access your infrastructure equipment.

This final phase is meant to limit the range of destination addresses that will accept traffic for a given protocol. This helps restrict traffic more granularly. Receive Access Controls Lists rACLs is a feature designed to protect the Route Processor RP on high-end routers from unnecessary traffic that could potentially affect system performance. Simply put, a rACL is an access control list that controls the traffic sent by the various line cards to the RP on distributed architectures like the Cisco Series Routers.

When packets enter the line cards, the packets are first sent to the line card CPU. It should be note that rACLs apply to traffic destined to the RP only, and does not affect transit traffic. They typically consist of permit statements allowing the protocols and sources that are expected by the RP, and may also include deny statements explicitly blocking unwanted traffic.

RPs always have a limited capacity to process traffic delivered from the line cards. If a high volume of data requires punting traffic to the RP, this may overwhelm the RP, resulting in a denial of service DoS condition. Under normal circumstances, most of the traffic handled by a router is in transit over the forwarding path. Only a small portion of the traffic needs to be sent to the RP over the receive path for further analysis. Examples of traffic that is directed to the router itself, and which is handled by the RP includes the following:.

It should be noted however, that rACLs are not effective mitigating attacks originated from trusted sources and based on trusted protocols those permitted by the rACL entries. For this reason, their deployment is recommended on all routers, but particularly on those facing the Internet or other external networks. As discussed previously in this document, having an adequate design of the address space facilitates deployment of security measures, in particular access control mechanisms like rACLs.

An rACL built without the proper understanding of the protocols and the devices involved might block critical traffic, potentially creating a denial of service DoS condition. In some networks, determining the exact traffic profile needed to build the filters might be difficult. For this reason, this document recommends a conservative methodology for deploying rACLs using iterative ACL configurations to help identify and eventually filter traffic.

Start by deploying a discovery or classification rACL permitting all the commonly used protocols that access the RP. Appendix B, "Commonly Used Protocols in the Infrastructure," contains a list of commonly used protocols in the infrastructure.

This discovery rACL should have both source and destination addresses set to any. In addition to the protocol permit statement, a permit any any log line at the end of the rACL can be used to identify other protocols that would be filtered by the rACL and might require access to the RP. The objective is to determine the protocols and the specific network uses. Logging should be used for analysis to determine everything else that might be communicating with the router.

Note Although the log keyword provides valuable insight into the details of ACL hits, excessive hits to an ACL entry that uses the log keyword might result in an overwhelming number of log entries and possibly high router CPU utilization. Use the log keyword for short periods of time and only when needed to help classify traffic.

Step 2 Review identified packets and begin to filter access to the RP. Once the packets filtered by the rACL in Step 1 have been identified and reviewed, implement an rACL with a permit any any statement for each of the expected protocols. Using deny any any log at the end can help identify any unexpected packet destined to the RP.

This rACL will provide basic protection and allow network engineers to ensure that all required traffic is permitted. The objective is to test the range of protocols that need to communicate with the router without having the explicit range of IP source and destination addresses. Only allow addresses within your allocated address block as source addresses. For example, if you are using the This step narrows the risk of attack without breaking any services.

It also provides data points of devices and users from outside your address block that might be accessing your equipment. Traffic from all outside addresses will be dropped. There may be some exceptions to the previous rule, for example an eBGP peer will require an exception because the permitted source addresses for the session will lie outside your address block.

This phase might be left on for a few days to collect data for the next phase of narrowing the rACL. Step 4 Narrow the rACL permit statements to only allow known authorized source addresses. Increasingly limit the source address to only permit sources that communicate with the RP. Refer to Appendix A, "Sample Configurations," for sample configurations.

Control Plane Policing CoPP is a security infrastructure feature that protects the control plane of routers and switches by enforcing QoS policies that regulate the traffic processed by the main system CPU route or switch processor. This helps protects the control plane of routers and switches from a range of attacks, including reconnaissance and direct DoS. CoPP applies to packets handled by the main CPU, referred to as control plane traffic, and which typically include the following:.

MQC allows the separation of traffic into classes, and lets the user define and apply distinct QoS policies to each class. The QoS policies can be configured to permit all packets, drop all packets, or drop only those packets exceeding a specific rate limit.

CoPP is available on a wide range of Cisco platforms, which all deliver the same basic functionality. However, CoPP has been enhanced on some platforms to leverage the benefits of the particular hardware architectures. As a result, some platforms provide advanced forms of CoPP. Non-distributed platforms implement a centralized software-based CoPP model, while some distributed platforms provide enhanced versions of CoPP: distributed and hardware-based. In addition, as a result of the hardware differences, CoPP protocol support may vary depending on the platform.

This document provides a generic description of CoPP. For detailed information on how CoPP is implemented on particular platforms, refer to the list of documents provided at Appendix C, "Related Documents. Functionally, CoPP comes into play right after the switching or the routing decision, and before traffic is forwarded to the control plane.

When CoPP is enabled, at a high level the sequence of events as follows:. Step 2 The port performs any applicable input port and QoS services. Step 5 Packets destined for the control plane are processed by CoPP, and are dropped or delivered to the control plane according to each traffic class policy.

Packets that have other destinations are forwarded normally. Compared with rACLs, the rate-limiting capability of CoPP makes it more effective when dealing with DoS attacks against the control plane, in particular those based on authorized protocols and sources. As an example, ICMP echo requests pings are commonly allowed for diagnostic purposes and should be permitted when used for their intended purpose.

CoPP can effectively handle this kind of situation by enforcing rate limiting policies per traffic class. For example, using MQC, you can define a traffic class to include ICMP echo requests and then drop packets exceeding the specified rate limit for this traffic class. In general, CoPP is recommended on all routers and switches, but particularly on those facing the Internet or other external networks.

Because CoPP filters traffic, it is critical to gain an adequate level of understanding about the legitimate traffic destined to the RP or SP prior to deployment. CoPP policies built without proper understanding of the protocols, devices or required traffic rates involved may block critical traffic.

This has the potential of creating a denial of service DoS condition. Determining the exact traffic profile needed to build the CoPP policies might be difficult in some networks. For this reason, this document describes a conservative methodology for deploying CoPP using iterative ACL configurations to help identify and to incrementally filter traffic.

Prior to developing an actual CoPP policy, required traffic must be identified and separated into different classes. Multiple classification schemes can be used, but one recommended methodology involves classifying traffic into distinct groups based on relative importance and traffic type.

This section presents an example based on ten different classes, which provides great granularity and is suitable for real world environments. It is important to note that, even though you can use this example as a reference, the actual number and type of classes needed for a given network may differ and should be selected based on local requirements, security policies, and a thorough analysis of baseline traffic.

This class defines traffic that is crucial to maintaining neighbor relationships for BGP routing protocol, such as BGP keepalives and routing updates. Sites that are not running BGP would not use this class. Maintaining IGP routing protocols is crucial to maintaining connectivity within a network. This class defines interactive traffic that is required for day-to-day network operations. This class would include light volume traffic used for remote network access and management.

This class defines high volume traffic used for software image and configuration maintenance. This class would include traffic generated for remote file transfer. This class defines traffic used for generating network performance statistics for reporting.

This class defines traffic used for monitoring a router. This kind of traffic should be permitted but should never be allowed to pose a risk to the router. With CoPP, this traffic can be permitted but limited to a low rate. Examples would include packets generated by ICMP echo requests ping and the traceroute command. This class defines application traffic that is crucial to a specific network. Currently, ARP is the only Layer 2 protocol that can be specifically classified using the match command.

This explicitly identifies unwanted or malicious traffic that should be dropped and denied access to the RP. For example, this class could contain packets from a well-known worm. This class is particularly useful when specific traffic destined to the router should always be denied rather than be placed into a default category.

Explicitly denying traffic allows you to collect rough statistics on this traffic using show commands and thereby offers some insight into the rate of denied traffic. This class defines all remaining traffic destined to the RP that does not match any other class.

MQC provides the Default class so you can specify how to treat traffic that is not explicitly associated with any other user-defined classes. It is desirable to give such traffic access to the RP but at a highly reduced rate. With a default classification in place, statistics can be monitored to determine the rate of otherwise unidentified traffic destined to the control plane.

Once this traffic is identified, further analysis can be performed to classify it. If needed, the other CoPP policy entries can be updated to account for this traffic. To implement the conservative methodology recommended for deploying CoPP, complete the following steps:. Step 1 Determine the classification scheme for your network. Identify the known protocols that access the RP and divide them into categories using the most useful criteria for your specific network. Select a scheme suited to your specific network, which may require a larger or smaller number of classes.

Step 2 Configure classification ACLs. At this point, each ACL entry should have both source and destination addresses set to any. In addition, the ACL for the Default class should be configured with a single entry: permit ip any any.

This will match traffic not explicitly permitted by entries in the other ACLs. Once the ACLs have been configured, create a class-map for each class defined in Step 1, including one for the Default class. Then assign each ACL to its corresponding class-map. Note In this step you should create a separate class-map for the default class, rather than using the class-default available on some platforms.

Creating a separate class-map , and assigning a permit ip any any ACL, will allow you to identify traffic not yet classified as part of another class. Each class map should then be associated with a policy-map that permits all traffic, regardless of classification.

The policy for each class should be set as conform-action transmit exceed-action transmit. Step 3 Review the identified traffic and adjust the classification. Ideally, the classification performed in Step 1 identified all required traffic destined to the router. However, realistically, not all required traffic will be identified prior to deployment and the permit ip any any entry in the class Default ACL will log a number of packet matches.

Some form of analysis will be required to determine the exact nature of the unclassified packets. Use the show access-lists command to see the entries in the ACLs that are in use, and to identify any additional traffic sent to the RP. To analyze the unclassified traffic you can use one of the following techniques:. Once traffic has been identified, adjust the class configuration accordingly.

Remove the ACL entries for those protocols that are not used. To find information about the features documented in this module, and to see a list of the releases in which each feature is supported, see the Feature Information Table at the end of this document. Use Cisco Feature Navigator to find information about platform support and Cisco software image support.

To access Cisco Feature Navigator, go to www. An account on Cisco. VASI interfaces do not support the attachment of queue-based features. VASI is implemented by using virtual interface pairs, where each of the interfaces in the pair is associated with a different VRF. Each interface pair is associated with two different VRF instances. The two virtual interfaces, called vasileft and vasiright, in a pair are logically wired back-to-back and are completely symmetrical.

Each interface has an index. The association of the pairing is done automatically based on the two interface indexes such that vasileft automatically gets paired to vasiright. Perform the following task to configure the VASI interfaces. The following example shows how to configure the VASI interface. No new or modified standards are supported, and support for existing standards has not been modified.

The Cisco Support and Documentation website provides online resources to download documentation, software, and tools. Use these resources to install and configure the software and to troubleshoot and resolve technical issues with Cisco products and technologies. Access to most tools on the Cisco Support and Documentation website requires a Cisco. The following table provides release information about the feature or features described in this module.

This table lists only the software release that introduced support for a given feature in a given software release train. Unless noted otherwise, subsequent releases of that software release train also support that feature. The following commands were introduced or modified: interface VASI.

To view a list of Cisco trademarks, go to this URL: www. Third-party trademarks mentioned are the property of their respective owners. The use of the word partner does not imply a partnership relationship between Cisco and any other company. Any Internet Protocol IP addresses and phone numbers used in this document are not intended to be actual addresses and phone numbers.

Any examples, command display output, network topology diagrams, and other figures included in the document are shown for illustrative purposes only. Any use of actual IP addresses or phone numbers in illustrative content is unintentional and coincidental.

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Infrastructure protection on cisco ios software based platforms how to start vnc server on windows

Know Your Infrastructure with Wired Assurance \u0026 Cisco IOS XE infrastructure protection on cisco ios software based platforms

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How to open mysql workbench in ubuntu Supported platforms. Customer insights and stories Speeds threat detection "The platform approach has been easy for our security analysts to work with, and we've already seen shortened threat detection times. Related security topics. A chain of trust exists when the integrity of each element of code on a system is validated before that piece of code is allowed to run. Cisco SecureX A simplified security experience SecureX is a cloud-native, built-in platform that connects our Cisco Secure portfolio and your infrastructure. It allows you to radically reduce dwell time and human-powered tasks.
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It should be noted however, that rACLs are not effective mitigating attacks originated from trusted sources and based on trusted protocols those permitted by the rACL entries. For this reason, their deployment is recommended on all routers, but particularly on those facing the Internet or other external networks. As discussed previously in this document, having an adequate design of the address space facilitates deployment of security measures, in particular access control mechanisms like rACLs.

An rACL built without the proper understanding of the protocols and the devices involved might block critical traffic, potentially creating a denial of service DoS condition. In some networks, determining the exact traffic profile needed to build the filters might be difficult. For this reason, this document recommends a conservative methodology for deploying rACLs using iterative ACL configurations to help identify and eventually filter traffic.

Start by deploying a discovery or classification rACL permitting all the commonly used protocols that access the RP. Appendix B, "Commonly Used Protocols in the Infrastructure," contains a list of commonly used protocols in the infrastructure. This discovery rACL should have both source and destination addresses set to any. In addition to the protocol permit statement, a permit any any log line at the end of the rACL can be used to identify other protocols that would be filtered by the rACL and might require access to the RP.

The objective is to determine the protocols and the specific network uses. Logging should be used for analysis to determine everything else that might be communicating with the router. Note Although the log keyword provides valuable insight into the details of ACL hits, excessive hits to an ACL entry that uses the log keyword might result in an overwhelming number of log entries and possibly high router CPU utilization.

Use the log keyword for short periods of time and only when needed to help classify traffic. Step 2 Review identified packets and begin to filter access to the RP. Once the packets filtered by the rACL in Step 1 have been identified and reviewed, implement an rACL with a permit any any statement for each of the expected protocols.

Using deny any any log at the end can help identify any unexpected packet destined to the RP. This rACL will provide basic protection and allow network engineers to ensure that all required traffic is permitted. The objective is to test the range of protocols that need to communicate with the router without having the explicit range of IP source and destination addresses.

Only allow addresses within your allocated address block as source addresses. For example, if you are using the This step narrows the risk of attack without breaking any services. It also provides data points of devices and users from outside your address block that might be accessing your equipment. Traffic from all outside addresses will be dropped.

There may be some exceptions to the previous rule, for example an eBGP peer will require an exception because the permitted source addresses for the session will lie outside your address block. This phase might be left on for a few days to collect data for the next phase of narrowing the rACL.

Step 4 Narrow the rACL permit statements to only allow known authorized source addresses. Increasingly limit the source address to only permit sources that communicate with the RP. Refer to Appendix A, "Sample Configurations," for sample configurations. Control Plane Policing CoPP is a security infrastructure feature that protects the control plane of routers and switches by enforcing QoS policies that regulate the traffic processed by the main system CPU route or switch processor.

This helps protects the control plane of routers and switches from a range of attacks, including reconnaissance and direct DoS. CoPP applies to packets handled by the main CPU, referred to as control plane traffic, and which typically include the following:. MQC allows the separation of traffic into classes, and lets the user define and apply distinct QoS policies to each class.

The QoS policies can be configured to permit all packets, drop all packets, or drop only those packets exceeding a specific rate limit. CoPP is available on a wide range of Cisco platforms, which all deliver the same basic functionality. However, CoPP has been enhanced on some platforms to leverage the benefits of the particular hardware architectures.

As a result, some platforms provide advanced forms of CoPP. Non-distributed platforms implement a centralized software-based CoPP model, while some distributed platforms provide enhanced versions of CoPP: distributed and hardware-based. In addition, as a result of the hardware differences, CoPP protocol support may vary depending on the platform. This document provides a generic description of CoPP. For detailed information on how CoPP is implemented on particular platforms, refer to the list of documents provided at Appendix C, "Related Documents.

Functionally, CoPP comes into play right after the switching or the routing decision, and before traffic is forwarded to the control plane. When CoPP is enabled, at a high level the sequence of events as follows:. Step 2 The port performs any applicable input port and QoS services. Step 5 Packets destined for the control plane are processed by CoPP, and are dropped or delivered to the control plane according to each traffic class policy.

Packets that have other destinations are forwarded normally. Compared with rACLs, the rate-limiting capability of CoPP makes it more effective when dealing with DoS attacks against the control plane, in particular those based on authorized protocols and sources. As an example, ICMP echo requests pings are commonly allowed for diagnostic purposes and should be permitted when used for their intended purpose.

CoPP can effectively handle this kind of situation by enforcing rate limiting policies per traffic class. For example, using MQC, you can define a traffic class to include ICMP echo requests and then drop packets exceeding the specified rate limit for this traffic class.

In general, CoPP is recommended on all routers and switches, but particularly on those facing the Internet or other external networks. Because CoPP filters traffic, it is critical to gain an adequate level of understanding about the legitimate traffic destined to the RP or SP prior to deployment. CoPP policies built without proper understanding of the protocols, devices or required traffic rates involved may block critical traffic.

This has the potential of creating a denial of service DoS condition. Determining the exact traffic profile needed to build the CoPP policies might be difficult in some networks. For this reason, this document describes a conservative methodology for deploying CoPP using iterative ACL configurations to help identify and to incrementally filter traffic. Prior to developing an actual CoPP policy, required traffic must be identified and separated into different classes.

Multiple classification schemes can be used, but one recommended methodology involves classifying traffic into distinct groups based on relative importance and traffic type. This section presents an example based on ten different classes, which provides great granularity and is suitable for real world environments.

It is important to note that, even though you can use this example as a reference, the actual number and type of classes needed for a given network may differ and should be selected based on local requirements, security policies, and a thorough analysis of baseline traffic. This class defines traffic that is crucial to maintaining neighbor relationships for BGP routing protocol, such as BGP keepalives and routing updates.

Sites that are not running BGP would not use this class. Maintaining IGP routing protocols is crucial to maintaining connectivity within a network. This class defines interactive traffic that is required for day-to-day network operations. This class would include light volume traffic used for remote network access and management. This class defines high volume traffic used for software image and configuration maintenance. This class would include traffic generated for remote file transfer.

This class defines traffic used for generating network performance statistics for reporting. This class defines traffic used for monitoring a router. This kind of traffic should be permitted but should never be allowed to pose a risk to the router. With CoPP, this traffic can be permitted but limited to a low rate. Examples would include packets generated by ICMP echo requests ping and the traceroute command.

This class defines application traffic that is crucial to a specific network. Currently, ARP is the only Layer 2 protocol that can be specifically classified using the match command. This explicitly identifies unwanted or malicious traffic that should be dropped and denied access to the RP. For example, this class could contain packets from a well-known worm. This class is particularly useful when specific traffic destined to the router should always be denied rather than be placed into a default category.

Explicitly denying traffic allows you to collect rough statistics on this traffic using show commands and thereby offers some insight into the rate of denied traffic. This class defines all remaining traffic destined to the RP that does not match any other class. MQC provides the Default class so you can specify how to treat traffic that is not explicitly associated with any other user-defined classes. It is desirable to give such traffic access to the RP but at a highly reduced rate.

With a default classification in place, statistics can be monitored to determine the rate of otherwise unidentified traffic destined to the control plane. Once this traffic is identified, further analysis can be performed to classify it. If needed, the other CoPP policy entries can be updated to account for this traffic.

To implement the conservative methodology recommended for deploying CoPP, complete the following steps:. Step 1 Determine the classification scheme for your network. Identify the known protocols that access the RP and divide them into categories using the most useful criteria for your specific network.

Select a scheme suited to your specific network, which may require a larger or smaller number of classes. Step 2 Configure classification ACLs. At this point, each ACL entry should have both source and destination addresses set to any. In addition, the ACL for the Default class should be configured with a single entry: permit ip any any. This will match traffic not explicitly permitted by entries in the other ACLs.

Once the ACLs have been configured, create a class-map for each class defined in Step 1, including one for the Default class. Then assign each ACL to its corresponding class-map. Note In this step you should create a separate class-map for the default class, rather than using the class-default available on some platforms. Creating a separate class-map , and assigning a permit ip any any ACL, will allow you to identify traffic not yet classified as part of another class.

Each class map should then be associated with a policy-map that permits all traffic, regardless of classification. The policy for each class should be set as conform-action transmit exceed-action transmit. Step 3 Review the identified traffic and adjust the classification. Ideally, the classification performed in Step 1 identified all required traffic destined to the router.

However, realistically, not all required traffic will be identified prior to deployment and the permit ip any any entry in the class Default ACL will log a number of packet matches. Some form of analysis will be required to determine the exact nature of the unclassified packets. Use the show access-lists command to see the entries in the ACLs that are in use, and to identify any additional traffic sent to the RP.

To analyze the unclassified traffic you can use one of the following techniques:. Once traffic has been identified, adjust the class configuration accordingly. Remove the ACL entries for those protocols that are not used. Add a permit any any entry for each protocol just identified. Step 4 Restrict a macro range of source addresses. Refine the classification ACLs, by only allowing the full range of the allocated address block to be permitted as the source address.

For example, if the network has been allocated This step provides data points for devices or users from outside the assigned address block that might be accessing the equipment. For example, an external BGP eBGP peer will require an additional ACL entry because the permitted source addresses for the session will lay outside the assigned address block.

This phase might be left on for a few days to collect data for the next phase of narrowing the ACL entries. Step 5 Narrow the ACL permit statements to authorized source addresses. Increasingly limit the source address in the classification ACLs to only permit sources that communicate with the RP. For instance, only known network management stations should be permitted to access the SNMP ports on a router. Step 6 Refine CoPP policies by implementing rate limiting. Use the show policy-map control-plane command to collect data about the actual policies in place.

Analyze the packet count and rate information and develop a rate limiting policy accordingly. At this point, you may decide to remove the class-map and ACL used for the classification of default traffic. If so, you should also replace the previously defined policy for the Default class by the class-default policy.

Control Plane Protection extends this policing functionality by dividing the Control Plane into three control plane sub-interfaces and allowing the enforcement of separate rate-limiting policies. In addition, CPP incorporates port-filtering and queue-thresholding.

Queue-thresholding is a mechanism that limits the number of packets per protocol hold in the control-plane input queue, preventing the input queue from being overwhelmed by any single protocol traffic. CPP is a feature that extends the policing functionality of the software-based CoPP by providing an additional layer of protection to the control plane. With CPP, the first layer of protection is provided by CoPP at an aggregate level by controlling all packets destined to the control plane.

Once traffic is processed by CoPP is then handled to CPP, the second layer of protection, and which divides the traffic into three categories. Each category is processed by a control plane sub-interface with independent rate-limiting policies. This dual layer of protection provides a control hierarchy that allows for finer policy definition and enforcement.

This feature is currently not available on platforms with hardware-based or distributed CoPP. The three control plane sub-interfaces implemented by Control Plane Protection are:. All host traffic terminates on and is processed by the router. This means packets that are not directly destined to the router itself but rather traffic traversing through the router and that require process switching.

In addition, CPP enhances the protection of the control-plane host subinterface by implementing Port-filtering and Queue-thresholding. Queue-thresholding is another feature that can only be applied to the control-plane host subinterface and that limits the number of unprocessed packets per protocol, preventing the input queue from being overwhelmed by any single protocol traffic.

At a very high level the sequence of events with Control Plane Protection is as follows:. Step 1 A packet enters the router configured with CoPP on an ingress interface. Step 2 The interface performs the basic input port and QoS services. Step 3 The packet gets forwarded to the router processor. Step 4 The router processor makes a routing decision, determining whether or not the packet is destined to the control plane.

Step 5 Packets destined for the control plane are processed by Aggregate CoPP, and are dropped or forward to the Control Plane Path according to the polices for each traffic class. Step 6 Packets sent to the Control Plane Path are intercepted by the Control Plane Protection traffic classifier, which classifies the packets into the corresponding control-plane subinterfaces. Step 7 Packets received by each control-plane subinterface are dropped or forward to the Control Plane global input queue according to the configured policies.

Step 8 In addition, packets sent to the control-plane host subinterface can be dropped or forwarded according to the Port-filter and Queue-thresholding policies before they are sent to the global input queue. This shields the control plane from traffic that might be part of DoS or other attacks, helping maintain network stability even during attack conditions.

CPP ability to divide the control plane traffic and rate-limit each traffic type individually, gives you greater traffic control for attack mitigation. Port-filtering and Queue-thresholding also provide for a more advanced attack protection. On the other hand, Queue-thresholding limits protocol queue usage mitigating attacks designed to overwhelm the input queue with the flooding of a single protocol. CPP is particularly useful on routers facing the Internet or other external networks.

For this reason, CPP should be deployed on all software-based routers as a key protection mechanism. Because CPP filters traffic, it is critical to gain an adequate level of understanding about the legitimate traffic destined to the RP prior to deployment.

CPP policies built without proper understanding of the protocols, devices or required traffic rates involved may block critical traffic. Determining the exact traffic profile needed to build the CPP policies might be difficult in some networks.

For this reason, this document describes a conservative methodology for deploying Control Plane Protection using iterative ACL configurations to help identify and to incrementally filter traffic. For configuration examples, refer to Appendix A, "Sample Configurations. This type of attack can be addressed with a Cisco feature called Port Security. Once Port Security is enabled on a port, only packets with a permitted source MAC address are allowed to pass through the port.

Port Security builds a list of secure MAC addresses in one of two ways, configurable on a per-interface basis:. It is possible to combine these two options on a single interface by defining a maximum number of MAC addresses to be permitted, along with some static MAC addresses. This may be used, for instance, to ensure that only a single, statically defined host is permitted to communicate on a specific port, such as in a lobby.

In Cisco IOS, the action to be taken upon a security policy violation is configurable based on the three options shown in Table Dynamic MAC address learning resumes upon the number of learnt MAC addresses dropping below the configured maximum number. Restrict 1. Syslog message generated.

Security violation counter increments. SNMP trap generated if enabled. Shutdown default 2. The port can only be re-activated through manual intervention 3. Note that the Port Security restrict violation mode will impact the CPU when an attack is in progress. It is thus recommended that the performance impact of this feature and its possible implications are carefully tested and considered prior to deployment.

Note The static configuration and administration of large numbers of MAC address can present an operational challenge that should be balanced against the security risks. A VoIP deployment, where a port may have Port Security enabled with the maximum number of MAC addresses defined as two, since two MAC addresses are required per port, one for the workstation and one for the phone. In addition, it is generally recommended that the security violation action be set to restrict so that the port is not entirely taken down when a violation occurs.

However, care should be taken due to the possible CPU impact of restrict mode. Port Security is supported on trunk ports but requires some specific configuration rules to be followed. The example below shows dynamic Port Security, restricted to two MAC addresses, being applied to an interface, with a security violation mode of restrict, such as may be deployed on a VoIP-enabled port. The example below illustrates how a port can be restricted for use by only one specific host, with the defined MAC address, such as may be employed in a lobby environment.

Sticky Port Security retains learnt MAC addresses across reboots, though it is not available on all switches. When sticky learning is enabled, the interface adds all MAC addresses that are dynamically learned to the running configuration and converts these addresses to sticky secure MAC addresses. In Cisco IOS, sticky Port Security can be enabled on an interface using the command switchport port-security mac-address sticky. Port Security aging is also configurable for both static and dynamic addresses, allowing the aging timers and aging types to be defined.

The timer is defined in minutes and can be configured as an absolute or as an inactivity timeout. The example below shows an inactivity aging time of two minutes being applied to an interface. SNMP trap rate-limiting can also be enabled to reduce the load on a device during an attack using the following command:.

Note An SNMP trap will only be sent if a security policy violation mode of restrict or shutdown is enabled on an interface. For more information on the switchport port-security command on the Catalyst , refer to the following URL:. Networks are built out of numerous hardware and software components that may fail or that may be subject to attacks.

Implementing redundant designs helps eliminate single points of failure, improving the availability of the network and making it more resistant to attacks. There are different ways one can implement redundancy, from deploying simple backup interfaces up to building complete redundant topologies.

Certainly, making every single component redundant is costly; therefore design redundancy where most needed and according to the unique requirements of your network. Cisco routers and other Cisco products allow the configuration of backup interfaces. A backup interface is an interface that remains in standby mode until the primary interface fails or goes down. The backup interface can be a physical interface such as a Basic Rate Interface BRI , or an assigned backup dialer interface to be used in a dialer pool.

When in standby mode, the backup interface remains shutdown and any routes associated with it do not appear in the routing table. The backup interface is brought up when the router detects that the primary interface goes down. One benefit of backup interfaces is that they are independent of routing protocols; hence their operation is not conditioned by routing protocol convergence, route stability and so on.

However, depending on the encapsulation used, the router may not detect when an interface goes down and in consequence the backup interface may not be brought up. Since the router cannot detect the failure, the backup link may not be activated. In Cisco IOS, backup interfaces are configured with the backup interface command. The following example sets serial 1 as the backup line to serial For more information on the backup interface command, refer to the following URL:.

In addition to backup interfaces, Cisco IOS offers other features useful for implementing link redundancy. This feature relies on ICMP pings to monitor the tunnel, and when the primary gateway becomes unreachable thorough the primary channel, a DDR connection is initiated from an alternative port. In this way, Reliable Static Routing Backup Using Object Tracking ensures reliable backup in the case of several catastrophic events, such as Internet circuit failure or peer device failure.

Some modular platforms allow the configuration of redundant Route Processors and other critical components, helping maintain the overall system and network availability. Cisco IOS routers provide the following element redundancy features:. This feature is available only on Cisco series routers. Supporting two RPs in a router provides the most basic level of increased system availability through a "cold restart" feature.

A cold restart means that when one RP fails, the other RP reboots the router. Thus, the router is never in a failed state for very long, thereby increasing system availability. With two NPE-Gs installed in a router, the feature provides the most basic level of increased system availability through a "partial bootup" feature on the standby NPE-G This minimizes the time that the router is in a failed state, thereby increasing system availability.

Switchover takes approximately one minute. Configuration syncing of startup configuration only and ROMmon environmental variables are supported. In RPR, the standby RP loads a Cisco IOS image at boot time and initializes itself in standby mode; however, although the startup configuration is synchronized to the standby RP, system changes are not. In the event of a fatal error on the active RP, the system switches to the standby processor, which reinitializes itself as the active processor, reads and parses the startup configuration, reloads all of the line cards, and restarts the system.

The active RP dynamically synchronizes startup and the running configuration changes to the standby RP, meaning that the standby RP need not be reloaded and reinitialized a "hot boot". This functionality provides a much faster switchover between the processors.

The association of the pairing is done automatically based on the two interface indexes such that vasileft automatically gets paired to vasiright. Perform the following task to configure the VASI interfaces. The following example shows how to configure the VASI interface. No new or modified standards are supported, and support for existing standards has not been modified.

The Cisco Support and Documentation website provides online resources to download documentation, software, and tools. Use these resources to install and configure the software and to troubleshoot and resolve technical issues with Cisco products and technologies. Access to most tools on the Cisco Support and Documentation website requires a Cisco.

The following table provides release information about the feature or features described in this module. This table lists only the software release that introduced support for a given feature in a given software release train.

Unless noted otherwise, subsequent releases of that software release train also support that feature. The following commands were introduced or modified: interface VASI. To view a list of Cisco trademarks, go to this URL: www. Third-party trademarks mentioned are the property of their respective owners.

The use of the word partner does not imply a partnership relationship between Cisco and any other company. Any Internet Protocol IP addresses and phone numbers used in this document are not intended to be actual addresses and phone numbers. Any examples, command display output, network topology diagrams, and other figures included in the document are shown for illustrative purposes only. Any use of actual IP addresses or phone numbers in illustrative content is unintentional and coincidental.

Skip to content Skip to search Skip to footer. Book Contents Book Contents. Find Matches in This Book. Log in to Save Content. PDF - Complete Book Updated: July 12, Enter your password if prompted. Step 2 configure terminal Example: Router configure terminal Enters global configuration mode. Step 3 interface vasileft number Example: Router config interface vasileft Configures the vasileft interface and enters interface configuration mode.

Range is from 1 to Step 4 vrf forwarding table-name [ downstream table-name ] Example: Router config-if vrf forwarding table1 Configures the VRF table. Step 6 exit Example: Router config-if exit Exits interface configuration mode and enters global configuration mode. Step 7 interface vasiright number Example: Router config interface vasiright Configures the vasiright interface and enters interface configuration mode. Step 8 vrf forwarding table-name [ downstream Example: table-name ] Example: Router config-if vrf forwarding table Configures the VRF table.

Step 10 exit Example: Router config-if exit Exits interface configuration mode and enters global configuration mode. Step 12 end Example: Router config end Exits global configuration mode.

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